Innovation requires sources of novelty, but the challenge is that not all sources lead to innovation, so its value needs to be determined. However, since ways of determining value stem from existing knowledge this often creates barriers to innovation. To understand how people address the challenge of novelty we develop a conceptual and an empirical framework to explain how this challenge is addressed in a software and scientific context. What is shown is that the process of innovation is a cycle where actors develop novel course of action and based on the consequences identified confirm what knowledge to transform to develop the next course of action. The performance of the process of innovation is constrained by the capacities of the artifacts and the ability of the actors to create and use artifacts to drive this cycle. By focusing on the challenge of novelty, a problem that cuts across all contexts of innovation, our goal is to develop a more generalized account of what drives the process of innovation (word count: 168).
Introduction
It was Schumpeter who first breathed modern life into the concept of innovation by distinguishing it from a new idea or invention to a product, process or approach successfully applied to practice (Schumpeter 1934) . However, it was also Schumpeter who warned us that the process of innovation itself is indeterminate; for if you could determine the significance of something new at the start then innovation would no longer be a unique and highly valued accomplishment. He went on to state that it was the requirement of novelty that renders the process of innovation indeterminate, and so he considered explaining how novelty is moved from an indeterminate to a determinate state to be the greatest unmet scientific challenge of his day (1932/2005) .
In the organization theory and strategy literatures the word novelty is generally used to refer to novel approaches or novel technologies (Zollo and Winter 2002; Winter 2006) ; so something new that is an innovation (Van de Ven 1986) or something new that is a competitive threat or disruptive (Porter 1998; Christensen 1997) . So whether a novel approach is good or bad depends if you are the one creating it or having to compete against it. What has not been discussed in the literature is that while innovation does require novelty, the challenge is that not all sources of novelty lead to innovation, so the value of those sources must be determined. In biology, evolution requires mutations, but most mutations are not viable when they emerge and so are selected out (Ridley 1993) . In social evolution the state of indeterminacy that Schumpeter referred to arises because determining value stem from existing knowledge that people use which often creates competency traps (Leavitt and March 1988 ) and barriers to innovation (Carlile 2002) .
These barriers are only addressed when particular knowledge that people use to determine value is changed in a specific way. Without such changes in how value is determined it is not surprising underperformance when it comes to trying to innovate (Sorenson and Stuart 2000) .
We propose that the challenge of novelty is addressed by what we call the noveltyconfirmation-transformation (N-C-T) cycle. For an individual then innovation is a cycle that requires both a capability to develop novel courses of action and a capability to confirm their value. This effort establishes a sweet spot for innovation where the consequences identified help an individual determine what knowledge to transform and what to keep the same to develop the next course of action to drive the innovation cycle. However, most innovation involves more than one person; often many individuals specializing in different domains, so the question that arises is how do actors distributed across different domains address the challenge of novelty collectively?
To address these socially distributed requirements we empirically examine what we call an "infrastructure for innovation." Infrastructure is made up of two things: artifacts and actors (Star and Rehleder 1996) . By artifacts (Star 1989; Carlile 2002) we refer to "human constructions" that range from material artifacts such as prototypes and measurement tools to more symbolic ones such as "language" and shared methods that reference and coordinate action with material artifacts or other actors (i.e., speech acts; Searle, 1969) . What all artifacts share in common is that they are used by actors to carry out their actions with other actors. Artifacts naturally vary in their capacity to represent novelty and confirm its value depending on the circumstances in which they are used (Carlile 2004) . By actors we refer to individuals and their abilities to use artifacts to develop and perform a particular course of action. In the case of innovation those abilities are to develop novel courses of action, confirm or determine their consequences, and based on those consequences transform existing knowledge to develop additional courses of action that can further drive the cycle of innovation. Overall, an infrastructure's capability for innovation is determined by the capacity of the artifacts and the abilities of actors to develop and use artifacts to drive the innovation cycle. If an infrastructure is lacking particular capacities and abilities it will be limited in its potential for innovation by comparison to an infrastructure that has those capacities and abilities. A description of the relative performance of an infrastructure for innovation provides one means of outlining the sources of organizational heterogeneity (Chandler 1962; Henderson and Cockburn 1994 ).
To fully conceptualize how an infrastructure for innovation can address the challenge of novelty we have chosen to empirically present two very different contexts of distributed innovation: one in the computer sciences and the other in the life sciences. In the computer sciences we examine an open source software (OSS) development community where the artifacts used (i.e., computer code, complier, test suites) are quite stable and "globally" shared among the actors involved. This makes addressing the challenge of novelty reasonably straightforward. In the life sciences we study an open collaboration of scientists developing treatments for Multiple
Sclerosis (MS) called the Myelin Repair Foundation (MRF). Because so little is known about
what causes MS there is significantly more novelty associated in developing innovative outcomes than in software. Further, the actors who are working together in this new scientific collaboration are highly specialized and there is little common language or metrics to share and assess the value of the knowledge being developed. In the first setting existing capacities and abilities are used to address the novelty. In the second setting new infrastructure (capacities and abilities) have to be developed to address the challenge of novelty associated with MS.
From a theory building perspective an examination of extremes is useful because one can identify the attributes of how an infrastructure facilitates the N-C-T cycle in one setting and compare it to the attributes of how an infrastructure addresses it in a more complex set of circumstances (Christensen and Carlile, 2009) . Such a comparison allows us to begin to move from "descriptive" theories of innovation to more "formal" theories (Glaser and Strauss, 1967: 35) .
In what follows we will outline the challenge of novelty and then introduce the noveltyconfirmation-transformation (N-T-C) cycle to conceptually explain how the novelty challenge is addressed. We then discuss how the N-C-T cycle occurs within infrastructure for innovation consisting actors with particular abilities to develop and use particular artifacts to increase and confirm sources novelty. We then present our two cases that demonstrate the operation of our framework for two very different set of innovation circumstances. We conclude the paper by proposing that the framework presented here provides a conceptual and empirical basis to develop a general theory of innovation; understanding what is required to address the challenge of novelty across a variety of innovation circumstances.
Opening up the Black Box of Innovation
Schumpeter struggled to adequately describe the process of how the challenge of novelty would be addressed, eventually describing innovation as a process of creative destruction (1935) .
In a similar vein those who followed him labeled this process "creative abrasion" (Leonard-Barton 1995) or a "dynamic capability" (Teece, et al., 1997 Innovation has also been described as a process of combining old and new knowledge (Schumpeter 1934; Winter 1983; Galunic and Rodan, 1998) . New knowledge gets at the requirement of novelty and old knowledge gets at a potential means of determining value, but a process of recombination doesn't specify how the natural tension between old and new is resolved; so addressing the challenge of novelty remains. This situation requires a process where actors develop sources of novelty, confirm the consequences of that action, transform existing knowledge and then develop another course of action to continue the cycle of innovation.
The Novelty-Confirmation-Transformation Cycle
Framed in terms of novelty, innovation is a challenge because an actor must develop sources of novelty while at the same time use existing knowledge to determine the consequences or the value of that novelty for innovation to occur. So to make progress we move beyond the tension of new and old knowledge and reframe it in terms of developing sources of novelty and confirming its value. Novelty is a reminder that not everything new is of value and confirmation is a reminder that not everything old is bad. So the black box is more than just a process of recombining old and new, more than a tension of old and new, but a process of creating a novel courses of action, confirming its value based on the consequences identified from it use and then transforming one's knowledge accordingly to develop another course of action.
To specify this process more fully let us consider the extremes of novelty and confirmation (see Figure 1 ). Under conditions of 100% confirmation any source encountered confirms and so conforms 100% to previous approaches or patterns (Jantsch, 1980) . Under these conditions innovation is not possible because nothing new or novel can be valued by an actor. To push in the opposite extreme under conditions of 100% novelty any source encountered lacks any confirmatory pattern and so no potential value can be appropriated by an actor. Under these circumstances a state of chaos exists and innovation cannot take place. Figure 1 represents all the potential circumstances faced by scaling them starting at the extreme of 100% confirmation (so no potential to identify sources of novelty) and then moving out to conditions of 100% novelty (so no potential to confirm the value of novelty). So conceptually speaking the novelty, confirmation and transformation cycle occurs at a "sweet spot" of innovation that lies somewhere between these extremes.
<insert Figure 1> However, this conceptual representation must give way to a practical one that expresses empirically the distributed challenge of establishing a sweet spot of innovation. By distributed we mean that innovation is more than just individual creativity, but is a collective effort of actors often across different domains or thought worlds (Dougherty 1992 ). These differences often beg the question if there is a shared knowledge or common language for actors to use as they jointly assess the value of novelty. Establishing this common language is complicated by the fact that actors have existing means of valuing novelty within their domain. Figure 2 expresses this relational or social dimension by reflecting a mirror image of the sweet spot of innovation in Figure 1 . This indicates the work necessary to develop and confirm the value of novelty and transform knowledge at this relational "sweet spot" for innovation. Here the capacity of the artifact that supports this "sweet spot" could be described as a boundary object (Star, 1989; Carlile, 2002) . But as is often the case artifacts that worked as boundary objects in the past may have to be changed to establish new capacities to develop and value new sources of novelty. Even if effective boundary objects are present the innovation cycle can breakdown if one actor lacks the ability to use the capacity of the artifact to represent novelty or identify consequences associated with it. Thus a breakdown in the capacity of the artifact as boundary objects or the ability of the actors using it further reveals the relational properties between an artifact and actors (see Figure 2 ) that must be met when identifying novelty and determining its consequences when the task of innovation is distributed across domains (Black and Carlile 2009; Carlile, 2004) .
<insert Figure 2> Overall, the distinction between confirmation and novelty offers greater causal specificity of the tension between what is old and new because confirmation refers to a particular "valued" outcome generated by a previous pattern; not just something old. Confirmation then specifies the value (and how it is structured) of what anchors the old, and so it concretely problematizes its relation to what is novel (i.e., capacities to represent, abilities to use current knowledge and associated interests). Further this process is an ongoing cycle where some novel courses of action are confirmed while others are disconfirmed which helps actors determine what knowledge to change and what to keep the same to develop the next course of action.
Infrastructure for Innovation
But how is this done and how can we empirically describe this innovation cycle? So far we have paid particular attention to the empirical categories of artifacts and actors. Both these categories have strong traditions in Science and Technology Studies (STS) literatures; in actor network theory (Latour and Callon 1995) and in Star and Ruhleder (1996) concept of infrastructure. We adopt the concept of infrastructure because it emphasizes the relational performance of structure as both social (actors) and technical (artifacts) and is inherently distributed (Gal, Yoo and Boland 2004) . Infrastructure also connotes how structure can be become taken for granted until breakdowns in performance reveal specific parts of it (Star and Ruhleder, 1996: 113 Baldwin and Hippel 2009). In the beginning stages these actors take existing artifacts such as a bike, surf board or skate board and modify its use in an activity in a new way. In the case of windsurfing a key effort was where and how to attach the sail to not only get good power, but also balance and maneuverability on the deck. The use of these artifacts led to more modifications about the location and size of the sail and how to "rig" it to the board in such a way that still allows the user to move around the sail easily as they shift their weight. This is clearly a process of trial and error, but if we look more closely actors put some artifacts into use in an activity in a new way and based on the consequences observed they intentionally transform some artifacts to improve performance in the next cycle. Sometimes those changes improve performance and sometimes they do not; so confirming or disconfirming the performance of a course of action is essential to the N-C-T cycle. And so with the development of artifacts in a new way (a novel course of action), confirming what worked better and what didn't, actors modify their artifacts and then put them to use again and the innovation cycle is repeated. At the most basic level novelty or newness is created by actors through some artifacts. These artifacts may be physical or they may be symbolic (i.e., language as speech acts; Searle, 1969) and so indirectly refer or effect other artifacts or how actor use or change a particular artifact.
An historical example of how an infrastructure of actors and artifacts is developed to perform better relative to an existing one can be seen in the development of the Kanban approach that became the revolutionary building block of the Toyota Production System. The Kanban system was a reaction to the waste and lack of adaptation created by the traditional push manufacturing system that characterized the majority of production systems in the first half of the 20 th Century (Fujimota, 1988) . For push systems efficiency was defined by maximizing individual machining and manufacturing processes by pushing throughput. The result of this was high inventories between individual operations and a large number of defects or latent problems hidden in those inventories. Defect rates remained high in push systems because each defect as a potential source of novelty was hidden in large inventories and once identified the costs and time frame associated with confirming the root cause in order to address the problem were very large.
In the resource scare world of post World War II Japan this level waste was unworkable for Toyota and so they implemented a pull manufacturing system build around a Kanban approach.
Here the production of parts in the first step is triggered by the consumption of parts in the second.
This pull system was established through a combination of part bins and Kanban cards that specified the number of parts that should be in the bin; creating a very clear dependency between actors. The use of these "pull" oriented artifacts made defects as a potential source of novelty, as indicated by more or less parts than specified by the Kanban card, easy for actors to identify and then confirm courses of action to address root causes. It is this pull infrastructure that became the backbone of continuous improvement at Toyota.
A push production system also has an infrastructure, but it is much slower to confirm defects and develop courses of action to drive continuous improvement. Change and transformation does occur in a push system, but its infrastructure lacks the capability to make such changes timely or well targeted at the root cause. The overall historical difference between a push and a pull system is that the latter's infrastructure has a greater capability to identify sources of novelty and more easily confirm what courses of action will drive continuous improvement (Fujimota, 1988; Young 1992; Spear and Bowen, 1999) . The key take away from this comparison of a push and pull system is that infrastructure is all around us and is for the most part taken for granted; and so as we consider how to do innovation on a broader scale we must reveal it's ubiquitous and taken for granted nature to better enable the potential role that actors and artifacts play in addressing the challenge of novelty.
Overview of Cases
To demonstrate how the novelty-confirmation-transformation cycle operates in an infrastructure for innovation, we use two cases that are in the domains of software development The logic for presenting the two very different circumstances (the first straightforward and the second more complex; the first utilizing existing infrastructure and the second developing new infrastructure) is that these differences allow us to tell in the case of OSS a very detailed story of how an existing infrastructure is used to address the increasing novelty and in the more complex case of MRF focus on key moves that actors took to develop a new infrastructure to address the high novelty and low confirmation circumstances faced. This "stretching" and the key differences in circumstances that follow allows us to demonstrate the potential value of the framework being presented as we push toward outlining a more general theory of innovation.
The cases are based on primary data collection; with the OSS case developed through realtime tracking, observation, and key participant interviews of an unfolding OSS project encompassing a complete software development cycle over a one-year period of time. The MRF case developed over a four year period that consisted of interviews and observations of all the key actors with access to proprietary documents and attendance at several key strategic scientific meetings amongst the principles. The level of detail presented in each case also provides insight into the infrastructure of innovation available in each effort; the OSS infrastructure can be observed and analyzed with high precision due to the extremely high fidelity of the artifacts used in the creation of the software. Access to email lists, source code repositories and software defect lists enable us to track to source code at the individual line level, the origins of novelty, the confirmation approach taken and the resulting transformation of the source code. This allowed us to highlight the basic events and mechanisms underlying the novelty-confirmation-transformation framework. Due to the complexity of drug development and the relatively long time frames taken to create a drug (typically 15 years from start to finish (DiMasi, et al., 2003) ), the MRF case provides an overview of the key moves in developing this new infrastructure and explore its operation and effectiveness via an illustrative vignette to demonstrate the infrastructure in action. The relative success of open source software (OSS) development projects has been an enigma for both scholars and practitioners of innovation. Over the past decade, academics in a variety of technical and social science disciplines have tried to build our understanding of the emergence, operation and success (or lack thereof) of OSS communities (Roberts et al, 2006; von Krogh and Hippel 2003) . That complex software systems running mission critical applications can be designed, developed, maintained and improved in a distributed setting, outside of the boundaries of traditional firms, with participants from around the world with heterogeneous motivations and organizational affiliations has been a major driver of scholarly inquiry. Equally interesting is that some of the largest software companies and the biggest holders of intellectual property (e.g., IBM, Google, Apple, and Oracle) have embraced OSS communities by encouraging the participation of their own personnel in, and donating copyrighted software and patents to, these communities, and integrating OSS software into their strategic product and service offerings.
While a vast majority of OSS projects are relatively small (Krishnamurthy 2002) , with a handful of community members devoted to solving specific technical problems, there are a significant and growing minority of projects (for example: Linux, Debian, GNOME, Apache, Perl, By all accounts, software development within the structures of any one organization is difficult enough with persistent and significant issues related to quality and timely delivery and failure (Shen et al 2000) . And one should expect that these problems are potentially greatly exacerbated in a distributed open community. In particular, OSS communities have to account for the input of multitudes of distributed contributors, working asynchronously on their own technical issues and absent "formal" managerial hierarchies driving alignment, and transform them into a coherent technical product that exhibits high performance and quality.
We posit that the core to the success of large-scale OSS communities is the use of a "readymade" infrastructure for innovation that enables the addressing of increasing novelty. The artifacts constituting the infrastructure are relatively well-established and mature technologies like broadcast email lists, common compilers and standardized test suites, and code repositories. These artifacts were not specifically designed for the task of distributed open source software development, rather they are general purpose communication and computation tools that were repurposed and adapted in service of global communities working together.
E-mail lists are the primary means of sharing information and coordinating work in OSS communities. A vast majority of technical activity occurs via contributors posting and replying to messages on the various public email lists of the community. This one-to-many communication flow ensures that all interested parties have at a minimum the ability to access the key issues at hand in the community. All conversations between individuals are public conversations as discussion on the e-mail list are sent to all subscribers and archived on public websites. The public nature of the conversation and the ability of "anyone" to chime-in to an ongoing discussion mean that the development of novelty in the community through new members and the identification of new issues are immediately made visible and available to all other community members. Thus the burden of developing novelty and understanding its consequences is easily shared amongst the community members.
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The e-mail list is the "place" where discussion of the software development activity for the community occurs. E-mail messages become the medium (work happens inside of an e-mail message) and/or carriers (actual code or signals of code completion) of all the community work.
The list then broadcasts all the work to subscribers and provides a continuous signal to the entire distributed membership as to current state of affairs in the community. The act of working and participating in the community becomes the act of communicating as well, and so the artifacts for doing the work and communicating about the work are not separate. The email list captures the essential task of an innovation infrastructure; novelty arises through the email list through new issues and ideas being posted or new people joining the list. Confirmation occurs through the interactions amongst the users on the list as they try to assess if the novelty presented is of consequence. Finally the email list is the vehicle for transformation as changes that are under consideration are communicated, debated, discussed and finally enacted through that medium.
All community members use a common software compiler to run and assess the code they are using and potentially change it. Compilers are used to create and change high level computer languages (e.g.: C, C++, Java) to low level machine instructions. The compiler is the primary means by which transformation occurs in the infrastructure. Individuals, based on their own needs or responding to the discussion on the email list will create or modify existing code to meet the emerging consequences as they begin to move between the requirements of novelty and confirmation. The compiler is used by individuals to test and verify that the code developed actually works as intended; so serves a very strong confirmation purpose. The compiler is also essential to community members because they can confirm that contributions from others work as advertised and also identify potential areas of weaknesses or bugs based on the compiler reports.
For all of these reasons the compiler serves as the community's "village idiot", a globally shared standard, which is hard to argue against given the standardized ("objective") reports produced by the compiler.
The compiler and related test suites enable confirming the value of completed work, i.e.
"Does it do what the contributor claims?" via "objective" measures. This verification works at both the basic level, i.e. does the changed system actually work as advertised, and at a systems level, i.e. is there any degradation in performance (speed, load handling, etc.) due to the changes.
Software development kits provide standard tools that produce shared ("objective") measures about the consequences of software changes, which can then be easily shared with others and serve as a basis for further development and innovation. These shared standards allow those submitting problems to utilize an "objective measure" to make their claims and provide detailed information on how specific problems were created along with associated computer-generated log files and use scenarios which allow others to recreate those sources of novelty on their own local machines. They participated by submitting a code "patch" to the developer email list which had all the changes that needed to be made to the PG software base for the IPv6 functionality to be enabled. Figure 4 highlights the iterative cycles of novelty, confirmation and transformation undertaken by the distributed community of PG developers once the IPv6 patch was received.
The 34 individuals who participated in its creation played a variety of roles during the production process including; code writer, reviewer, discussant, tester, integrator and committer to CVS.
Kukard's initial code submission got immediate attention on the developer list when a non-core periphery member 4 , N. Conway, immediately noted variance from coding style conventions between the PG community's expectation and the submission. This type of confirmation, although
on the surface appears trivial, is important to ensuring that the diverse individuals participating in open source development have a common reference style for understanding code. Equally important to note is that the source of the confirmation was a periphery member who had recently started to participate actively in the developer community. Indicating that the openness of the PG community's infrastructure enables newcomers to make substantive contributions to novelty and confirmation relatively easily and quickly in areas they have interest and ability.
<insert Figure 4> Kukard immediately transformed the code and resubmitted it to the developer's list based on the style and formatting critique. The code then got further transformed by a core developer, B.
Momijian, who further modified the code to fit within the structure of the PG architecture. Here we observe an initial novelty, confirmation and transformation cycle for this feature. However, this is one of the many cycles that are instantiated within the PG developer community infrastructure and it highlights how a very complex technology gets developed and put into practice by the diverse individuals that are participating in its creation. A majority of novelty related to IPv6 is introduced through users finding problems with the latest version of the code 5 as they try to run the database within their own heterogeneous use environments and then either attempting to create a local solution to the problem themselves and/or alerting the developer email list of the problem for general consideration and help.
The novelty generated is due to the newness of the IPv6 technology and its integration with a mature software system that runs on many different systems and conditions. Ex-ante, the developer community does not have a full understanding of the changes required to adapt both the IPv6 patch and their own systems to robustly enable the feature within the PG software. Overall we observe 13 episodes of novelty during the development of this feature. Novelty development and identification is immediately followed by confirmation where more established user/community members identify consequences and pinpoint their source. Here the CVS and compiler artifacts provide significant assistance in tracking the exact cause of the problem and address them by transforming specific parts of the code.
The fact that this occurs in a public email list means that initial diagnoses about the source of the novelty have a higher probability of being confirmed or disconfirmed since it is easy for a large number of people with a larger variety of approaches to participate. Hence, immediately following B. Momijian's initial commit of the IPv6 functionality, J. Conway, another periphery member found the latest CVS version of the software not working at all in his computing environment. Joint diagnostic work with B. Momijian revealed that this problem could be tracked down to the recent changes made in the code for IPv6. Momijian solved the initial problem by simply reversing the CVS commit and restoring the code to the older state. He then used that interaction to guide the further changes he made to the IPv6 patch which he then recommitted to CVS two weeks later. The IPv6 feature development had 20 confirmation episodes.
Transformation in the innovation infrastructure comes about after confirming the value of the novelty. Here the object of innovation, the concrete artifact (e.g., software code) that is being developed, is being changed to reflect the new understanding about the consequences associated with a given sources of novelty that must be accounted for to satisfy the performance the requirements of the software. Transformations itself then leads to more novelty that can then repeat the cycle we have outlined. In our setting there were 17 episodes of transformation for this 5 In most open source projects once a feature is made committed to CVS it becomes part of the alpha distribution of the code. This means that all developers and users interested in advanced early functionality will use the latest CVS version of the code to run their systems. This is prior to the code entering beta-testing or becoming an official release.
one feature. The above analysis also reveals that there is not necessarily a strict one-to-one ratio of novelty-confirmation-transformation. While novelty events trigger the cycle, confirmation and transformation can occur multiple times within a cycle until a resolution is achieved.
What is striking about Figure 4 is the number and diversity of individuals participating in the co-creation of the IPv6 functionality. While the initial work on the IPv6 was done in an unrelated project and the first application to PG occurred via an individual who was not a core member, indeed Kukard stopped participating after sending in the patch, other members of the community jointly took over the further development and integration of this feature into PG. But 
The Myelin Repair Foundation (MRF): Creating a New Infrastructure
As early as the middle of the 1990s, the drug discovery and development process responsible for finding cures and treatments for serious diseases and illnesses, as practiced by most major pharmaceutical firms, was incurring a significant "innovation deficit" (Drews 2003) .
Despite huge investments of both public and private monies, increasingly sophisticated tools, technologies, and techniques, and the advent of genomic sequencing, proteomics, systems biology, high throughput screening and other marvels, R&D output of the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries, as measured by the number of novel drug applications to the FDA, was considered "low," while costs continued to skyrocket-some $50 billion annually (Munos 2009 ).
Several analyses suggested that the industry was in the midst of a productivity crisis with flat to declining approvals of new molecular and biological entities and a steady year-over-year increase in R&D expenditures (FDA White Paper 2004; Cockburn 2006) . The latest research showed that more than 10 to12 years and $1 billion were needed to bring a drug, from the laboratory bench to the patient bedside (Munos 2009 ).
Many reasons have been cited for this apparent drop in performance, including the idea that the ability to systematically innovate in the past was attributable to pursuing single-cause diseases.
Thus, the vast increase in lifespan occurring in the first half of the 20th century, especially in the developed world, was driven by relatively low-technology interventions in combating infant mortality and relatively simple (in hindsight) drugs aimed at combating infectious diseases and vitamin deficiency, along with public health improvement projects like clean water, sanitation, and pest control (Epstein 2006) . Many high-impact innovations, like ether for anesthesiology, penicillin for infections, and insulin for diabetes, came about because it was possible to identify a single-cause biological mechanism and control it by relatively simple (in retrospect) chemical entities. However, the current organization of the R&D work dedicated to this "low-hanging" fruit innovation strategy was poorly suited to identifying and addressing the multi-causal nature (i.e., genetic, environmental, infections) of the remaining disease categories (i.e., neurological, cancers,
etc.).
Meanwhile, the number of academic papers published in the life sciences had increased by a factor of eight in the past five decades, exceeding 800,000 annually by 2008 and appearing in over 5,000 journals 6 . Such vast expansion in knowledge might have suggested there would be greater, and faster, results in treatment and cure development. But paradoxically, the opposite had occurred. Scientists had begun to narrow their focus of investigation and were measured and rewarded for "publishing results" in specialty journals-a process that could take anywhere from 3.5 to 5.5 years from discovery to publication (Stern and Simes 1997) and that generated even more and wider gaps in knowledge across disciplines (Dougherty 2007) . The published research, moreover, was typically far removed from the practicalities of drug development, and hence from "bedside" results. Furthermore, while academic science publicly and historically espoused the values of openness and knowledge sharing, the reality was that most scientific labs were highly secretive and rarely collaborated and shared knowledge with others before and even after the publication of their results (Campbell et al. 2006 ) thus reducing the possibility of collectively solving tough problems.
Given that productivity is stagnant and the diseases remaining are more complex why aren't new approaches to drug discovery being systematically tried by those in the industry?
Currently expensive mergers targeted at acquiring the pipeline of "developed" new molecular entities are the primary approach being used to deal with this innovation crisis ( multi-causal disease can be more easily driven. Given the multi-causal nature of MS (i.e., genetic, environmental, autoimmune, viral) there is much that scientists don't know about treating the disease and much still needs to be identified and explored from and across a variety of disciplinary backgrounds. Without the development of shared artifacts (i.e., shared hypothesis, common testing criteria, agreed upon dosage rates, shared data, etc.) confirming the value of these sources of novelty will be slow in coming and hard to leverage given their isolated development. This is the troubling situation when a significant innovation gap or challenge exists; you need sources of novelty but you also need to develop new approaches to confirm the value of those novel sources.
To address this sizable paradox the MRF choose to go against a primary scientific starting point that has dominated both academic and for-profit science firms especially when we consider the funding of that science. The MRF took a key insight that came out of the development of an AIDS treatment and decided to move away from the goal of curing the disease to arresting and potentially repairing the damage done by the disease; in the case of the MRF repairing the damaged myelin sheathing around our nerves caused by MS.
While this may look like a retreat from the "real" goal, it should be seen as a necessary confirmation strategy in the face of significant novelty. By focusing on repair the MRF was When the scientists agreed with to work jointly on problems, their first task as a team was to list the top 100 scientific questions that needed to be answered for the development of a viable repair treatment for MS. Over two days, the PIs, along with key facilitation by Johnson and Bromley, brought to bear what they knew and didn't know about myelin and MS and then collectively agreed to the key research questions that would guide their scientific activities around remyelination. As these issues were identified the PI's began to realize that despite differences in disciplinary background and language that much of what they wished they knew focused on similar problem areas and key mechanisms. So from those 100 questions, six problem areas were identified as key gaps that the MRF would work on which became their integrated research plan ( Figure 5 ). What made this third move of constructing these shared problem areas of such value is that they also defined key dependencies between disciplines and the scientific work to be done.
This brought a clear focus to the projects would drive the scientific work to be done across 7 A typical researcher had a laboratory with 13 to 16 post-doctoral fellows, graduate students, and technicians. 8 The PI from McGill University left the MRF in 2008 due to increased administrative duties at his home institution. disciplines and labs; which set of PIs would be involved; and even more specifically which "repair" hypotheses would be the starting points (see Figure 5 for these details). What we see here is that the shared sweet spot of a repair approach become populated with sequences of shared scientific activities where novel hypotheses could be generated and their consequences or value confirmed (or disconfirmed as the case may be) and next steps could be rapidly taken.
<insert Figure 5> Now that the PIs had begun to work on the joint development of "repair" hypotheses, the that would best lead to developing a "repair" treatment. In these efforts we see the specifics of the infrastructure under development; specific shared practices and artifacts used to work together (i.e., repair hypotheses, testing standards, databases, mouse models, etc.).
Mouse models are an example of artifacts that provide significant value in scientific research (Murray and Stern, 2007) . Mouse model are used to test particular treatments or isolate a specific biological mechanism or gene associated with a particular disease. Given the lack of knowledge about MS and its multi-causal nature isolating some or any of the mechanisms What the group started to build toward was the question if there was a better "next" hypothesis for Barres's lab to focus on? Did the MRF now know more as a group to transform what was currently proposed and develop a more "innovative" repair approach? When the discussion ended Barres and the other PIs and SAB members had agreed that his proposed next hypothesis was no longer as consequential in developing a treatment to repair damaged myelin as initially thought. What was more surprising is that the group developed and then confirmed a "better" next repair hypothesis and they did so in only four minutes.
After the presentation we spoke to two of the PIs and three of the SAB members directly involved in the conversation we just observed. We posed the question: "Is this type of process of discovery unusual within the MRF?" The quick answer by all was no. We next informed them that the process of confirming the value (disconfirming) the proposed "next" hypothesis and then confirming a new one had only taken four minutes. They agreed that was a typical time frame for such discussions. The next question we asked was "How long this would have taken before the existence of the MRF?" The timetable given to us varied from four to five years if it would have happened at all. They talked about the long cycles of developing the science within an individual lab, assembling data and developing tools, then getting through the peer review process without revealing too much of the key science, and then the remote possibility of having such a detailed presentation and follow up conversations with such a broad but interested set of participants. We then made a symbolic contrast between "four years to four minutes" and all found this contrast shocking despite their agreement of the facts behind it. But they got over the surprise quickly, and one PI nodded and said, "I guess the more I think about it, this is often how things work; and this is how being a part of MRF makes our science faster and better than it was before."
A faster innovation cycle is always a good thing, but the key question is how is such a cycle driven? The MRF infrastructure help actors generate more innovative courses of action by more rapidly developing novel hypothesis, confirming their value and based on the consequences identified determining what knowledge they were using to transform. All of this produces more innovation courses of action and potential treatments for repairing myelin.
Discussion: Characterizing N-C-T Cycles and Comparing Cases
To frame our discussion of these two cases we will characterize the OSS and MRF N-C-T cycles. Following that we will provide a much broader comparison across all the cases touch upon: OSS and proprietary software development (PSD), and the MRF and pharmaceutical and academic science (PAS). Now while some could suggest that such licenses are anti-intellectual property or antipatent, they should be seen as an agreement among actors on how their work will be shared. As an artifact in the infrastructure the impact of such licenses on OSS communities is that it increases substantially the sources of novelty that can be generated and shared as well as increases the infrastructure's capability to determine the value of those increased sources of novel code. Further since a larger variety of actors can participate in OSS this rapid cycle infrastructure and their highly confirmatory outcomes makes valuing their abilities to assess and create code quite easy.
The nature of the infrastructure is an ongoing means of selecting in skillful or "knowledgeable" actors into the infrastructure. This is why the infrastructure of OSS has tremendous capability to develop sources of novelty and determine their value to improve existing code. whether patent or licenses, should be seen as one of many artifacts in the infrastructures and as such its particular impact of the capability of that infrastructure to drive the N-C-T cycle must be considered, not just as a "thing" that defines who benefits from it economically.
Considering intellectual property as an artifact that impacts the distributed nature of the N-C-T cycle is a clear way to understand how and why the MRF differs from current for profit and academic approaches to drug discovery. Commercial drug development has a clear intellectual capital focus on a patent approach to drug discovery and the economic benefits that follow.
Academic science primarily focuses on intellectual property as a part of the processes publishing, tenure and securing funding/grants. Although both these two approaches to intellectual property were stable for a long time the current productivity crisis in drug development has begun to question these approaches (Munos 2010) . In the particular case of academic science despite the explosion of scientific knowledge as measured by the amount of published scientific papers that knowledge often remains within specialized domains driven by the requirements of tenure; so often lies unconnected from other knowledge domains about the human body that could lead to more effective treatments.
For commercial pharmaceutical companies most treatments developed have been for single causal diseases and so their siloed scientific efforts and patent focused approaches have worked (Pisano 2006) . However, these knowledge and IP silos are proving problematic given that most remaining diseases are multi-causal and require multi-disciplinary efforts to develop potential treatments. Because of the specialization of knowledge within academic careers and disciplinary silos and the secrecy and narrow notions of IP that follow, the MRF had to develop a more distributed infrastructure in terms of knowledge and ownership given the multi-causal nature of MS. Current pharmaceutical and academic science (PAS) approaches is an infrastructure with highly specialized actors and artifacts take years if not decades to develop. We see this specialization and long time frames in the educational systems of scientists were they start with an undergraduate, PhD, post doc (perhaps two) and then an assistant professor and eventually a tenured professor. And as our four years to four minutes story reveals it can take many months and often years to test the potential value of a novel hypothesis (i.e., a novel course of action).
Given this existing infrastructure the MRF had to go through a number moves (a repair approach, selecting 5 PIs, identify dependencies across repair approaches, developing artifacts for day to day activities and real time information flow across experiments and labs) to develop a new infrastructure that could distribute the innovation task across more locales while at the same time accelerating the speed upon which the value of novelty was confirmed and innovative course of action developed.
In comparison to traditional approach to drug development the MRF should be seen as moving higher up in the novelty space not only because so little is known about MS, but also so much new infrastructure needs to be developed to purse this across a variety of disciplines. This is why those involved in the MRF had to select particular actors and also develop artifacts to better address this multi-causal disease in a multi-disciplinary fashion. By comparison traditional pharmaceutical and academic science (PAS) approaches remains lower down in the space because they continue to focus on more traditional single causal approaches and their associated siloed orientation. The past successes of these PAS approaches also lead to a combination of tight controls over IP for ownership and of secrecy to insure academic status.
In Figure 7 we offer a rough comparison of proprietary software (PSD), OSS, pharmaceutical academic science (PAS) and the MRF along the dimension of the relative amount of novelty to address and the relative newness of the infrastructure required to address that novelty.
We dimensionalize the amount of novelty from low to high and the status of the infrastructure as existing to new (needs to be developed). In the case of software, OSS is addressing similar problems to PS in term of the amount of novelty, it's just that they take a more distributed approach and so add the artifact of shared IP regime that allows them to develop and confirm more sources of novelty. In the case of drug discovery, the MRF is addressing the multi-disciplinary nature of the scientific challenge so are much higher up in the novelty space relative to PAS and because of that they also need to develop a lot of new infrastructure to be successful.
These comparisons are crude but do offer up a "relative" scaling of innovation problems and ways of organizing for them along the dimensions of the amount of novelty and newness of the infrastructure required as we naturally make comparison across empirical cases documented in the literature. Further we see that the N-C-T cycle helps us move beyond the current dualisms found in the literature as tension or combination of old and new (Galunic and Rodan, 1998) , or ambidexterity (Tushman and O'Reilly, 1996) or even exploration and exploitation (March 1991 
Conclusion
We feel that studies of innovation are at a critical stage of development; of moving from an initial stage of developing descriptive theories of innovation to developing more formal theories of innovation (Glaser and Straus, 1967) . Overall, to facilitate this movement we focused on the challenge of novelty, a problem that cuts across all contexts of innovation, and compared how it is addressed across a variety of circumstances (Christensen and Carlile 2009) . To adequately understand the challenge of novelty we developed both a conceptual and empirical framework.
Conceptually, the novelty-confirmation-transformation cycle describes how the challenge of novelty is addressed. Empirically an infrastructure for innovation specifies how actors develop and use artifacts to address the challenge of novelty. These frameworks were then applied to the PostgreSQL software community and the Myelin Repair scientific collaborative which allowed us to characterize the nature of sweet spot of innovation based on these very different circumstances. 
